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to lower-income countries drawing upon recent studies 
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(SADC). It finds that migrants in poorer countries have 
very limited access to formal social protection such as 
social security systems, and that the legal social protection 
frameworks are far from making benefits portable. Rather, 
migrants have to rely on informal social protection, and 
it is often migration itself that constitutes a form of social 
protection for migrants and their families. This means that 
making migration safer for low-income migrants is vital 
to allow migrants to fully benefit from their migration 
experience and to ultimately enhance their social protection.
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This paper analyzes the issue of social protection for migrants by looking at formal and informal social 
protection provisions. In particular, it presents the latest global data on the social protection status on 
migrants, including undocumented migrants. The paper gives special attention to lower-income countries 
drawing upon recent studies from the Southern African Development Community (SADC). It finds that 
migrants in poorer countries have very limited access to formal social protection such as social security 
systems, and that the legal social protection frameworks are far from making benefits portable. Rather, 
migrants have to rely on informal social protection, and it is often migration itself that constitutes a form of 
social protection for migrants and their families. This means that making migration safer for low-income 
migrants is vital to allow migrants to fully benefit from their migration experience and to ultimately 
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1  Introduction 
Migration is a phenomenon that has been prevalent during most of the past centuries. 
During the course of history, its intensity varied across regions and times and its impact 
on countries has been substantial. According to the United Nations (UN), about 3 percent 
of the world’s population—that is almost 191 million people—lived and worked outside 
their country of birth in 2005. This number is about 20 percent higher than the number of 
migrants in 1960 (UN 2006). Due to the underlying economic and demographic 
imbalances, this trend is likely to persist and calls for policies that effectively manage 
migration to the benefit of all—migrants, origin countries, and host countries.
1
The lack of access to social services and portability of social rights for migrants not only 
raises concerns about vulnerabilities of migrants, but also creates distortions in labor 
markets and in migration decisions. If migrants do not fully benefit from social security 
contributions or tax contributions because the associated benefits are not accessible or not 
portable, they might prefer to avoid contributions and work informally or underreport 
earnings. If migrants have made considerable contributions, but the acquired social rights 
are not portable, migrants’ decision to return to the home country or to stay in the host 
country might be biased towards the latter because of the expected income loss due to, for 
example, forgone pension benefits. Lack of portability of social rights could therefore 
undermine return migration and deprive origin countries—many of them developing 
countries—of important beneficial development effects.
 
These substantial and increasing migration flows raise questions about the social 
protection for international migrants. The atypical lifecycle of migrants requires special 
provisions for their social protection to ensure that they can adequately manage their 
social risks. Migrants move between countries and hence between distinctively regulated 
labor markets and social protection systems, which creates specific vulnerabilities. Newly 
arrived migrants are in a particularly vulnerable position as they are away from their 
home community and have no access to important informal social networks and safety 
nets. In addition, the access to formal social services in the new host country is typically 
delayed until some months or years after arrival. At the same time, migrants might have 
contributed to formal social protection systems in their country of origin or former host 
countries, yet any rights to benefits from these systems might cease to exist or 
substantially diminish with the arrival in the new host country. Similarly, any 
contributions made to the social protection system of the new host country might be lost 
after the migrant departs because the associated social rights and benefits might not be 
portable across international borders. Finally, migrants—in particular low-skilled, 
undocumented migrants—face challenging labor market conditions in host countries 
related to cross-border recruitment, information asymmetries between employers and 
migrants, and visa requirements tied to specific employers. 
2
This paper aims at filling important knowledge gaps on social protection for international 
migrants, in particular with regard to portability of social security rights. Holzmann, 
Koettl, and Chernetsky (2005) have made a first attempt to study the issue of portability 
 
                                                 
1 See Holzmann and Muenz (2004). 
2 See Koettl (2006).   4 
in more detail, but the focus was largely on social protection for migrants in host 
countries with Bismarckian, social-security-type systems, like in continental Europe and 
the United States. The purpose of this paper is to build on existing knowledge and expand 
the research to social protection for migrants in other countries—in particular host 
countries with tax-financed social systems (Australia, New Zealand, and the United 
Kingdom) and middle and low-income host countries (focusing on so-called “south-
south” migration). Additionally, much improved global data on the social protection 
status of migrants is presented. In particular, an effort was made to improve the estimates 
of undocumented migrants by incorporating results of country and regional studies to 
gain a better understanding on where undocumented migrants come from and where they 
go. 
This paper is the outcome of a joint research project between the Institute of Development 
Studies (IDS) and the World Bank’s Human Development Network – Social Protection 
and Labor (HDNSP) unit. The research took place over the last two years and was 
partially funded by the U.K. government’s Department for International Development 
(DfID). While IDS was conducting surveys among migrants in Malawi, South Africa, 
and the United Kingdom, focusing on informal social protection tools, the World Bank 
compiled global data on the status of social protection for migrants and conducted legal 
analysis of social systems in the European Union (EU), East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), 
and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This paper focuses on the 
World Bank’s part of the research and only briefly touches upon informal social 
protection. 
The analysis shows that mostly migrants from and going to high-income countries enjoy 
access to and portability of social benefits, which translates into 23 percent of all 
migrants worldwide. The most disadvantaged migrants are those moving within low-
income regions. In these regions, formal social protection provisions are less developed, 
and migration is characterized by high numbers of undocumented migrants. Bilateral 
social security agreements, which are relatively successful in developed countries and 
constitute a good practice model, cannot directly be applied to low-income regions with 
less developed social security systems, substantially lower coverage among natives and 
migrants, and limited administrative capacities. This research suggests that for south-
south migrants, governments need to improve the legal position for migrants, implement 
immigration policies that acknowledge current migration patterns, and provide basic 
rights such access to justice or banking services.  
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows. The next section gives an 
overview on national and international practices regarding social security provision and 
portability. The main focus is on portability of pension benefits and to some extent of 
health care benefits. Subsequently, the paper presents global estimates on the social 
protection status of migrants and elaborates on the disadvantaged position of south-south 
migrants. This is followed by an assessment of the situation of south-south migrants in 
more detail and an explanation why a different approach is required to improve social 
protection in low and middle-income host countries. The final section discusses the 
results and provides policy implications. 
   5 
2  Definition and Good Practices of Social Protection for 
Migrants 
The following section provides a definition of social protection for international migrants 
and then discusses access to social services that various regions and countries provide to 
their immigrants. Subsequently, portability of social security rights across international 
borders will be discussed, with a focus on pensions and health care; problems, gaps, and 
good practices will be analyzed. 
2.1  Definition 
Social protection aims at reducing vulnerabilities and managing the economic risks of 
individuals, households, and communities. Social protection includes interventions and 
initiatives that support individuals, households, and communities in their efforts to 
prevent, mitigate, and overcome risks and vulnerabilities and enhance the social status 
and rights of the marginalized.
3
First, access to social security and services is crucial for migrants as it affects their level 
of vulnerability. Social services include health care benefits, long-term social security 
benefits like old-age and disability benefits, and short-term benefits like social assistance, 
maternity, and unemployment benefits, family allowances as well as public housing and 
education. Migrants can often not fully benefit from these social services, either because 
access is only granted some time after arrival, or because family members are spread 
across various countries. If migrants fail to generate sufficient income to cover all their 
needs—and in many cases the needs of their family left behind—their situation worsens 
significantly if they have no access to safety nets. At the same time, according to Borjas’ 
selection model, countries with generous social protection systems could attract low-
skilled immigrants through unintended self-selection, which is why many host countries 
follow policies of limited or delayed access.
 Thus, social protection covers formal (for example, 
social security and social assistance) and informal (for example, community transfers) 
mechanisms of social risk management, including migration as social protection, 
provided on the private, community, market, or public level, but also comprises political 
processes that empower and include marginalized groups with regard to access to social 
protection mechanisms. 
Social protection for international migrants consists of four components: (i) access to 
formal social protection—that is, social security and social services—in host and origin 
countries; (ii) portability of vested social security rights or rights in the process of being 
vested between host and origin countries; (iii) labor market conditions for migrants in 
host countries and the recruitment process for migrants in the origin country; and (iv) 
access to informal networks to support migrants and their family members.  
4
Second, portability of social security rights is important to migrants to avoid financial 
losses, but also to social security institutions out of concerns of actuarial fairness. 
Portability is the ability to preserve, maintain, and transfer vested social security rights or 
 
                                                 
3 This definition builds on Holzmann and Jorgensen (2000), Shepherd (2004), and Sabates-Wheeler and 
Devereux (2008). 
4 See Borjas (1987).   6 
rights in the process of being vested, independent of nationality and country of 
residence.
5
It is important to distinguish portability from exportability of social benefits. In order to 
achieve full portability, some cooperation between the social security institutions of the 
origin and the host country is required in order to ensure a joint determination of benefit 
levels for a particular migrant. In the case of pensions, for example, this is done via a 
totalization of periods of contribution in both countries.
 Portability is particularly important for long-term benefits that have an 
explicit (like in the case of old-age pensions) or implicit (like in the case of health care) 
pre-saving element. In the absence of portability, migrants run the risk of financial loss 
when leaving their host or home country. For example, migrants contributing to an old-
age pension scheme in their host country could lose part of their contributions and 
benefits when returning to their home country. Similarly, migrants contributing to health 
insurance in their host country could lose coverage when moving back to their origin 
country. They might find it difficult to find affordable health insurance in their origin 
country after return, in particular when close to or during retirement. By default, they 
could end up benefiting from the origin county’s social system or health system, although 
they might have spent most of their productive life working abroad and contributing to a 
foreign social system. This could have important fiscal implications for social systems in 
origin countries. 
6
Third, labor market conditions are an essential component for the social protection for 
migrants. Migrants are often more disadvantaged in foreign labor markets relative to 
local labor market participants due to information asymmetries and differences in 
bargaining power between employers and employees. These information asymmetries 
also apply to native workers, but may be more severe for migrants who are less familiar 
with the labor market conditions and labor laws in the host country. Countries have 
created labor market policies to overcome failures in the labor market which strike a 
balance between the needs of employers and the need for protection of workers. These 
policies—enacted and implemented on the national level—regulate the workings of labor 
markets, that is, hiring and firing conditions, minimum wages, benefits, and other rights 
for workers. For migrants, though, who often are recruited in the origin country to work 
in the labor market of the host country, many of these regulations might be undermined 
because of substantial information gaps. These information gaps could be exploited by 
employers, recruiters, and middlemen to make unjustified demands towards migrants.
 That is, social security 
contributions from both countries are taken into account. Exportability, on the other hand, 
simply requires that benefits accrued in one country are payable in another country. It 
requires no cooperation between institutions as the social security institution of one 
country alone determines the level of the benefit. Typically, if a benefit is exportable, but 
not portable, the level of the benefit is lower because contributions paid in other countries 
are not taken into account. In practice, it has to be acknowledged that some people may 
succeed in bypassing disadvantages caused by mere exportability, for example, by 
maintaining a residence status or bank account in the country paying out the benefit. 
7
                                                 
5 See Cruz (2004) and Holzmann, Koettl, and Chernetsky (2005).  
6 The next section elaborates on totalization. 
7 For example, the promise of high earnings may be used to extract unjustified fees or to offer unfavorable 
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addition, if work permits and visas are tied to work contracts and migrants are facing 
limitations to choose their employer freely, the bargaining power is tilted toward the 
employer, creating possibilities for exploitation and abuse. Finally, if immigration 
policies are too restrictive vis-à-vis the demand for foreign labor, employers and migrants 
face incentives to meet in the informal labor market and the labor market for 
undocumented migrants, which is not subject to any regulations and might provide weak 
or only informal social protection for migrants. 
Informal social protection—the final component—means that migrants manage their 
risks by relying on multiple informal institutions and networks that act as informal social 
safety nets. These informal insurance networks and groups are an important complement 
to formal social protection tools and are of particularly importance to undocumented 
migrants. For them, these networks are often the only source of support in times of crisis, 
but also the only source of information on the host country and access to indispensable 
(social) services. 
This paper focuses primarily on access to formal social services for migrants and 
portability of acquired social benefits across international borders. The social benefits of 
primary interest are long-term benefits such as pensions, which are either based on social 
security contributions or income tax contributions. For social security systems, 
contribution payments give a right to benefits once the eligibility conditions are met, and 
benefits are being paid over a protracted period of time. For tax-financed pension 
systems, eligibility criteria are typically based on residence requirements and minimum 
age. Some consideration is also given to health care, which usually does not require long 
waiting times before eligibility is met. Yet, also health care is a long-term benefit in the 
sense that it has a pre-saving element: younger contributors are typically net-contributors, 
paying more into the system than they benefit from; older contributors, on the other hand, 
pay less than they receive in benefits (due to high demand for health services when old). 
For example, Figure 1 below depicts average net costs, risk-adjustment payments, and 
premiums for Swiss males over age groups in 2006, which clearly shows the pre-saving 
element for younger contributors. If these benefits are not portable, the contributor and 
the social security institutions on the origin and host country are affected (either gain or 
lose) by migration. 
In order to analyze the status of social protection for migrants, the following section will 
first provide a brief overview of social protection provisions in various regions and 
subsequently elaborate on pensions and health care benefits in more detail.   8 
 
Figure 1: Net costs, risk adjustment payments, and premiums per month per male member, averages 
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Source: Figure 3.1 in World Bank (2009). 
 
2.2  Social protection provisions for international migrants at the 
national level: access and exportability 
Formal social protection for international migrants is mostly a matter of national 
legislation. The host country regulates what benefits migrants have access to and under 
what conditions. Additionally, it defines what benefits can be received after leaving the 
country. The European Union (EU) has the most advanced and complex system of 
portability of social benefits. EU nationals enjoy full non-discriminatory access to all and 
portability of most social benefits. With respect to third-country nationals, equality of 
treatment is granted after a certain period of residence (no later than after five years 
according to EU Directive 109/2003). This means that even third-country nationals enjoy 
full access to and portability of social benefits within the EU no later than after five years 
of residence. Additionally, EU nationals can export their pensions to literally any country 
in the world. The coverage of health care outside the EU is much less developed. 
The North American social security systems also include provisions for international 
migrants. Canada allows access to the tax-financed universal pension, health care 
benefits, and the earnings-based pension to all residents, including most migrants.
8 
Exportability of the pension, though, is limited to persons who have resided in Canada for 
at least 20 years. Migrants in the United States need at least 40 quarters of coverage (10 
years) to the U.S. social security system before they are entitled to a pension benefit. 
Once migrants qualify for the pension benefit, the pension is exportable to most countries 
in the world. Health care benefits, like the U.S. MediCare benefit, do not provide 
coverage abroad.
9
                                                 
8 Seasonal agricultural migrant workers are excluded. See United States Social Security Administration 
(U.S. SSA, 2007). 
9 The Canadian health plan covers emergency services abroad and reimburses costs up to the amount what 
the same treatment would have cost in the home province. 
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All migrants in New Zealand have immediate access to education, accident 
compensation, public health services, and in some cases emergency benefits for special 
hardship. After two years of residence, migrants gain access to services like housing 
assistance, unemployment benefits, sickness benefits, and interest free student loans for 
tertiary education. The public superannuation benefit, which is set at 66 percent of the 
New Zealand average wage, can be claimed by all residents after age 65, but is only 
portable to countries with which New Zealand has concluded a bilateral social security 
agreement. Special provisions exist for Pacific Islanders whose New Zealand 
superannuation is exportable to their origin country even in the absence of a bilateral 
agreement.
10
In Australia, access to social services differs for temporary and permanent migrants. 
Temporary migrants have no immediate access to social security benefits and public 
health services. However, upon leaving Australia, they get refunded for the contribution 
they were required to pay. Permanent migrants have access to some benefits immediately 
and to the full range of social services after 104 weeks of residence. Similar to Canada, 
Australia has a dual social security system, including a means-tested national pension and 
a mandatory, earnings-based occupational pension. The latter is a tax deductible saving 
scheme where employer and employee each contribute 9 percent of the salary to a 
savings account. The national pension can be received after 10 years of continuous 
residence in the country and is payable abroad to one of the 18 countries with which 
Australia has concluded a bilateral social security agreement. The mandatory 
occupational pension, which was only introduced in 1993, is paid as a lump sum based on 
the total contributions made to the system, taking into account interests and 
administrative fees after reaching the age of 55. It can be cashed in earlier and also be 
taken abroad; however in this case, it is taxed by the Australian government which 
provides strong disincentives for this option.
 Thus, the benefits are portable to countries that have concluded a bilateral 
social security agreement and are exportable for Pacific Islanders. 
11
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in the Middle East are special in the 




Looking across regions, In middle-income countries, much less is known about 
provisions in national law on the access to social services and the portability and 
exportability of benefits for migrants has been much less studied in low and middle-
 At the same time, migrants (and their employers) do not have to contribute to 
the system either (at least not directly), so the issue of portability of benefits and lost 
contributions is not relevant. This leaves the migrant with the responsibility to provide for 
certain benefits like old-age or disability pensions on his or her own. If the migrant’s 
origin country is sufficiently developed, this could happen in the form of voluntary 
contributions to the public system or by buying financial products from the private 
insurance market. Regarding health care, the visa sponsor of the worker is obliged by law 
to provide health insurance to the migrant, but it is unclear how well these provisions 
work. 
                                                 
10 See Woolford (2009). 
11 See Woolford (2009). 
12 The GCC countries are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.   10 
income countries. Some middle-income countries of the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, 
Latin America, and North Africa have well-developed social security systems. Some of 
the countries in these regions host significant numbers of migrants, like, for example, 
Argentina, Belarus, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Venezuela. The social protection 
provisions for migrants in these countries are likely to be similar to those of high-income 
countries with contribution-based social security systems. Still, as Rofman, Lucchetti and 
Ourens (2008) point out for Latin American countries, coverage can vary substantially 
across regions. The coverage usually decreases with the level of income and the status of 
migrants in this respect is unclear. 
The low-income regions of Central Asia, South Asia, South-East Asia, and Sub-Saharan 
Africa include various major host countries like Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, India, 
Kazakhstan, Pakistan, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, and Uzbekistan; yet, even less is 
known about the social protection status of their immigrants. Many of these host 
countries have weak social security systems that cover only a small portion of the labor 
force. A large part of migrants are undocumented and participate in the informal sector, 
which raises concerns about the social protection status of these migrants. Most formal 
social protection is provided through tax-financed social assistance and migrants seem by 
and large to be excluded from these benefits.
13
On the international level, legal provisions relating to social protection for international 
migrants are scarce, with the exception of bilateral (and multilateral) social security 
agreements. These currently constitute the best practice on how to coordinate access to 
and portability of social benefits for migrants. Efforts to regulate social protection for 
migrants on a global level, though, are scarce.
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2.3  Social protection provisions for international migrants at the 
bilateral and multilateral level: portability 
  
 
Bilateral social security agreements usually include provisions on nondiscrimination 
between nationals and migrants with respect to social security and rules of cooperation 
between the social security institutions of the signatory countries. The latter coordinate 
the totalization of periods of contribution that migrants accrue in the two or more 
countries and regulate the transfer and payment of acquired social security entitlements. 
Thus, these agreements usually include totalization for the purpose of vesting and benefit 
calculation. That is, they determine the benefit based on the contribution periods of all 
countries in which the person has worked in, and apportionment rules as well as rules 
                                                 
13 The shortcomings of social protection for migrants in low-income regions are discussed in more details 
below. 
14 The International Labour Organization (ILO) and the UN have adopted a series of conventions 
concerning social protection for international migrants, most notably the International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. The Convention, however had 
limited success, it was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1990, but came into force only after 13 
years, with just 22 ratifying states. Similarly, the ILO adopted a number of conventions dealing with 
nondiscrimination and equal opportunity for migrants in their host countries, all of which suffered from 
weak support in terms of ratification by member states. ILO Convention 157, for example, aims at 
establishing a global regime of portability of benefits, but has only been ratified by three countries.   11 
regulating the disbursement of benefits.
15
EU regulations related to the portability of social security benefits are the most advanced 
example of multilateral arrangements. EU Regulations 883/2004 is an extensive legal 
provision that ensures far-reaching portability of social security entitlements within the 
EU. When moving within the EU, even third-country migrant workers enjoy the same 
rights as EU nationals with respect to the portability of social security and benefit 
entitlements after five years of residence within the EU. The EU is also leading efforts to 
enhance social security cooperation within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP).
 Most agreements refer to long-term benefits 
like old-age, disability, and survivor pensions and other annuities. Health care benefits 
are to a much lesser extent subject to social security agreements. Also, purely tax-
funded—as opposed to contributory—benefits like social assistance or maternity 
allowances are usually explicitly exempt from portability. 
Social security agreements are also arranged on the multilateral level, like in the 
European Union, Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Southern Common Market 
(MERCOSUR), and, in the future, even between some Latin American and European 
countries through the Ibero-American Social Security Convention.  
16
Outside this multilateral framework, many EU member states have also concluded 
bilateral social security agreements with non-EU countries and have created an extensive 
global network of portability arrangements. The UK, which is receiving and sending 
large numbers of migrants, is a good example of an EU country having extensive 
national, bilateral and multilateral legislation in place; details are given in 
 
Social security agreements with Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria have been concluded 
under this initiative. 
Box 1. 
In the Latin American and Caribbean region (LAC), some migrants can take advantage of 
social security provisions that have been established in the multilateral frameworks of 
CARICOM and MERCOSUR. The MERCOSUR agreement came into force only in 
2004, while the CARICOM Agreement on Social Security (CASS) was concluded in 
1996.
17 To the extent that these countries have social security provisions, accrued 
benefits are made portable within the regions, though limitations apply. The 
MERCOSUR agreement came into force only in 2004, while the CARICOM Agreement 
on Social Security (CASS) was concluded in 1996.
18
                                                 
15 All countries means all that are part of the agreements. 
16 Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and the Palestinian 
Authorities. 
17 Suriname is not included in the agreement as it has an incomparable social security system. 
18 Suriname is not included in the agreement as it has an incomparable social security system. 
 Forteza (2008), however, mentions 
that the CASS has had limited impact so far, as the number of beneficiaries is very small. 
Possible reasons are insufficient information among potential claimants, the fact that the 
agreement applies only when workers have not completed the vesting periods in any of 
the involved countries, and the different requirements of age and periods of contributions 
to access to the benefits in member states. 
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Box 1 The UK Social Security System and Migration
19
The UK is a major immigrant receiving country in the EU hosting about 4.8 million foreign nationals. 
Additionally, it has about 4.2 million citizens residing outside the UK
 
20
                                                 
19 See Avato (2008b). 
20 The numbers are from the year 2000. 
. There are roughly four different 
categories of countries with respect social security coverage and portability arrangements: the countries of 
the European Economic Area (EEA), countries having concluded a reciprocal social security agreement 
(SSA) with the UK, countries which have a bilateral SSA with the UK that is subject to several restrictions 
and all other countries. The most comprehensive system of handling portability social security and health 
care benefits is among EEA countries. This means that within the EEA most contributory benefits (mostly 
long-term benefits such as public pensions and survivor benefits) are fully portable and thus paid as if the 
person lived in the UK. Further, all periods of contribution that had been paid in various EEA countries 
(and countries with a bilateral SSA) are included for totalization and calculating the replacement rate for 
the pension. People coming from an EEA country to the UK have access to all benefits subject to the same 
eligibility as UK residents. 
The UK has concluded several reciprocal SSAs with non-EEA countries which grant migrants similar 
privileges as to migrants within the EEA. These countries are Barbados, Bermuda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Croatia, FYROM, Israel, Jamaica, Jersey and Guernsey, Mauritius, Serbia and Montenegro, Philippines, 
Turkey and the USA. If a person goes to one of these countries to live there she can receive all of her state 
pension, bereavement and widow benefits.  
Moreover, the UK has SSAs subject to certain restrictions with Canada, Japan, New Zealand and South 
Korea. All of these but New Zealand are primarily Double Contribution Conventions (DCC) which also 
include several features of reciprocal SSAs as the ones mentioned above. The agreement with Australia 
ended in 2001 and people who worked until that date are subject to special provisions. The restricted 
agreements are similar to the reciprocal agreements mentioned above with respect to totalization rules. The 
restriction applies to the portability of the benefits. The state pension and some other benefits are usually 
indexed over time—either by inflation or wage growth--but for people emigrating to the respective 
countries the benefits will only be paid out at a frozen rate determined by the time the person had left the 
UK. This means that these benefits will not have a so-called ‘uprating’ and are consequently, despite of 
being exportable, not fully portable.  
People going to countries which do not have an agreement with the UK are able to claim benefits - mainly 
pension and bereavement benefits - for each year they contributed to the UK social security system but the 
same rule of no upratings applies and there is obviously no consensus on double contributions. Therefore, 
the pension and bereavement benefits are, exportable but not portable. 
The pension is obviously the most important benefit in terms of scope that is paid to recipients abroad. In 
2006, the UK had an average caseload for state pensions of 11,671,137 from which 1,041,977 (or 9%) were 
located outside the UK. Of these pensioners 32% lived in EEA countries, 17% lived in countries having 
concluded a bilateral social security agreement with the UK, 19% were in Canada, New Zealand, Japan and 
South Korea, another 23% in Australia. Cases in countries where no agreements exist, amount to 8%.  
Altogether, the UK is certainly among the nations having recognized the need to manage portability given 
rising international migration flows. However, there are still many countries sending large numbers of 
migrants to the UK, e.g. India and South Africa, which have no social security agreement with the UK. 
Policy makers of both sides may want to look into options to improve social protection for these migrants.  
   13 
More recently, the Ibero-American Social Security Convention has been signed which 
includes 19 LAC countries
21 as well as Andorra, Portugal, and Spain. The arrangement 
will mostly apply to contributory systems of social security, including disability benefits, 
old age pensions, widows' pension, and workers’ compensation. The Convention is 
envisioned to provide far-reaching arrangements on portability between the signatory 
countries.
22
The degree to which countries coordinate the portability of social security benefits via 
bilateral agreements varies greatly across regions. For example, the EU and other 
Western European countries have concluded 1,628 bilateral social security 
arrangements—either through bilateral or multilateral agreements—of which 1,034 are 
intra-EU arrangements (see 
 
Table 1 in next chapter). East Asian and Pacific (EAP) 
countries, on the other hand, have concluded only 181 such arrangements, although they 
provided the highest share (22 percent) of all migrants worldwide as of 2000. South 
Asian countries only concluded three arrangements, and even though Sub-Saharan 
African countries have concluded 177 arrangements it should be noted that a large 
number (75) is created by Reunion, which is counted as part of France in all French 
agreements. 
The next section discusses what these arrangements include and what issues they raise. 
 
2.3.1  Pensions 
Pensions (old-age, disability, and survivor pensions) are currently the most portable 
benefits. Even in the absence of bilateral social security agreements, most migrant-
receiving countries have provisions in their national law that allows the export of 
pensions, though for export to countries without an existing bilateral agreement 
restrictions may apply. Italy for example, allows all individuals regardless of nationality 
and country of residence to claim pensions when retirement age is reached given that the 
minimum contribution period was completed (currently 20 years). Nevertheless, the 
difference between pensions claimed under existing agreements versus just national 
legislation can be substantial. In the case of Italy, 84 percent of pension applicants from 
abroad are covered by social security agreements, which comprise 67 percent of pensions 
paid abroad (Avato 2008b). Thus, only 16 percent make use of the national legislation on 
portability. 
Also, some countries like Germany or the UK may apply reduction rates if the pension is 
paid to nationals or residents of countries with no bilateral social security agreement and 
who are residing outside their former host country. For example, the UK does not index 
pensions for individuals who moved to a country where no bilateral agreement has been 
concluded so that the pension amount is not adjusted over time (Avato 2008a). Further, 
the U.S. does not allow the export of US pensions to certain countries.  
                                                 
21 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela 
22 See Online Pioneer (2007). For a copy of the convention in Spanish language, see Organización 
Iberoamericana de Seguridad Social (OISS).   14 
Despite the possibility in many countries to export pensions to other countries, there are 
substantial losses in the absence of bilateral social security agreements. First of all, most 
agreements prevent double coverage, which is mostly the case for migrants who are sent 
to another country by a company that is located in the home country. Without a bilateral 
agreement, the company would have to pay contributions in both the home and the host 
country. For example, for migrants from India to the US the double contribution causes 
significant costs to Indian employers. Indian employers often pay their employee’s share 
on top of their own share. The employee usually stays in the US only for a shorter period 
and receives no benefits from the US in return. The India-US CEO Forum in 2006 
estimated these costs to amount US$ 500 million.
23
Bilateral agreements, on the other hand, prevent vesting losses by allowing totalization of 
periods of contribution to determine a migrant’s entitlement for a pension.
 Due to the likely increasing 
emigration of Indian professionals the Indian government has a great interest in 
negotiating social security agreements with the US but also with European countries (so 
far only Belgium) and is pushing for an agenda with the respective countries.  
24 Vesting 
losses occur when the individual leaves a country before completing the minimum years 
of contributions in the country required to receive the benefit. For example, a Mexican 
migrant in the United States who has worked nine years in each country is not entitled to 
a pension in either country because both countries require a minimum of 10 years of 
contributions.
25 If the two countries had signed a bilateral social security agreement, the 
migrant could combine the contribution periods (18 years total) and claim a pension in 
both countries.
26
As much as bilateral agreements prevent migrants from the losses, they also cause an 
administrative challenge to both the host and the home country. Since most bilateral 
agreements are the result of a complex negotiation process between states—a process that 
has to pay tribute to the specifics of the national social security laws of the states 
involved —bilateral agreements are diverse, each one containing differing regulations 
and setting separate standards. This practice necessarily results in a highly complex set of 
 This concept applies to practically all bilateral agreements, although the 
minimum requirements vary and depend on the national legislation. 
Moreover, totalization prevents final wage losses and back-loading losses. The former 
occur when pension benefits are based on the last salaries. In that case, early leavers will 
have a pension computed on the salary they earned when they left the country, which is 
usually lower than the actual last salary the migrant might earn at retirement age back in 
the origin country. Back-loading losses occur when pension schemes have increasing 
accrual rates. This means that benefit accrual rates at first grow slowly, and faster only 
during later years—again to the disadvantage of early leavers. Bilateral agreements 
ensure that the replacement rate is calculated after the periods of contribution have been 
totalized. The benefit formula and indexation are adjusted to avoid wage and back-
loading losses.  
                                                 
23 Asher (2008). 
24 This classification of losses follows Forteza (2008). 
25 See Holzmann et al. (2005). 
26 Mexico and the Unites States have, in fact, signed a bilateral social security agreement, but so far it has 
not been ratified by either Congress.   15 
provisions on the portability of social security benefits. Within the EU, in contrast, all 
bilateral arrangements are based on a single legal source, namely EU Regulation 
883/2004. Such a multilateral approach has the advantage of generating common 
standards and regulations avoiding complex structures by multiple bilateral agreements 
that may discriminate between different migrant groups and cause excessive 
administrative burden. Also, having a blueprint for bilateral agreements may be useful; 
the Euro-Mediterranean agreements between the EU and Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
could serve as an example. 
Other issues that have to be considered in the context of portability—and in the absence 
or presence of bilateral agreements—refer to the fact that pensions need to be paid via 
international money transfers. Even though, the international payment systems between 
many countries have improved immensely in recent years, money transfers may still 
cause disadvantages to recipients as the transfers are subject to fees and fluctuations in 
the exchange rates, which can be particularly high in countries with less developed 
financial systems. Finally, it can be problematic for migrants in particular to claim there 
entitlements.
27 For example, in the U.S. unclaimed contributions are estimated to total 
US$400 billion.
28
Although social security agreements are currently the best practice, there are alternatives 
to deal with portability issues. In some countries, like, for example, Hong-Kong (China), 
short-term migrant workers may opt out of the pension system altogether. In GCC 
countries, migrants are excluded from the pension system. In both of these situations, the 
migrant worker should continue to contribute into the pension system of the home 
country, or make provisions for a private pension plan. The Philippines, for example, 
address this by offering emigrants insurance in their home country.
 Many times, these contributions are made by unauthorized workers 
using falsified social security numbers. These workers are, in fact, entitled to benefits 
independent of residence and work permit status, but due to the informal nature of their 
job they might have difficulties providing prove of their work history. 
29
From the perspective of portability, defined contribution (DC) systems seem more 
amenable.
  
Such a legal setup gives the migrant a certain amount of choice in avoiding the loss of 
contributions, but there are also drawbacks. First, the option to insure in the home 
country depends on whether public institution and the financial market are sufficiently 
well developed in the origin country. Even if public or private plans are available in the 
origin country, the employer in the host country is not obliged to contribute. Also, it 
should be noted that having no access to the public pension system often means having 
no access to public health services. 
30
                                                 
27 Note that this can also be a problem of non-migrants. 
28 Holzmann et al. (2005) 
29 Agunias and Ruiz (2007). 
30 The drawback is that DC schemes often place more risk on the worker. A more detailed discussion on 
DC versus defined-benefit (DB) systems, though, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 These DC plans are saving plans that accumulate contributions by the 
employee and employer in the beneficiary’s account. At retirement, the accumulated 
amount is partially or fully transformed into an annuity, taking into account the cohort-
specific survival probability and the associated future interest stream. Such defined   16 
contribution plans can either be fully funded (FDC) or unfunded (nonfinancial or 
notional, NDC). Both FDCs and NDCs could be made portable without too many 
efforts.
31
Even if countries move towards DC-type pension systems allowing for better portability a 
certain degree of coordination among countries is still required. For example, the tax 
treatment of contributions and benefits in the countries involved should follow the same 
principle.
 The Australian fully funded second tier pension system is a good example in 
this respect—though pensions are taxed in Australia when taken abroad. 
32
2.3.2  Health Care 
 Further, converting accumulated amounts into annuities requires a 
sufficiently developed and stable financial market. Also, rules need to be found how to 
deal with the changes in the risk pool for annuitization when switching from one country 
to another (e.g. survival probabilities may be different). Finally, redistribution elements 
differ in many countries; for example, how the systems deal with noncontributory periods 
such as unemployment ore maternity, or guaranteed minimum pensions. These issues 
need further arrangements if made portable. 
Summing up, bilateral agreements are currently the best practice to make pensions 
portable. Moving more towards DC-type pension plans—public or private—may 
substantially improve portability but will not replace bilateral coordination. 
 
Bilateral agreements on the portability of health care benefits have hardly been concluded 
in the past. Exceptions are Turkey and the successor states of the Former Yugoslavia with 
their agreements with Austria and Germany, and the Moroccan-German agreement. In 
the case of the Turkish-Austrian agreement, a Turkish retired migrant who has worked in 
Austria and never been employed in Turkey is covered by the Austrian health system. 
The migrant nevertheless enjoys advanced access to the Turkish health system and 
receives medical treatment in Turkey like a Turkish retiree. Any additional costs that 
incur to the Turkish system are reimbursed by the Austrian system, via direct transfers 
between the two systems.
33
In the absence of a bilateral agreement returning migrants suffer coverage losses after 
return to the origin country. That is, migrants lose long-standing coverage in one country 
and have to look for new coverage in another country. Because of age and existing pre-
conditions, they might not be able to find new coverage or only expensive coverage at 
significantly increased rates. This is especially the case for retired migrants who do not 
qualify for the home country pension and thus the health care provisions. In this sense 
absence of totalization with regard to health care benefits is closely related to the absence 
of totalization with regard to pension benefits. For example if a retired Mexican migrant 
has only worked a short period of time in Austria and receives a pension from Mexico, 
the migrant is not entitled to Austrian health care benefits. A totalization agreement 
between the countries would avoid such coverage loss. Further, in the case of a retired 
Moroccan migrant, receiving a French pension in Morocco, the migrant has to cover all 
  
                                                 
31 See Holzmann et al. (2005) 
32 Harmonization of tax treatment is an issue that equally affects DC and DB schemes alike. 
33 Holzmann et al (2005).   17 
medical expenses in Morocco; moreover, this migrant has to continue to contribute to the 
compulsory French health care system.
34
The UK has several agreements with countries that allow UK residents to have their 
expenses for emergency care and hospital treatment reimbursed by NHS, but emergency 
care is not sufficient for permanently returned migrants.
 
In some host countries in Europe it is possible to claim reimbursements for medical 
expenses that occurred abroad. In the case that a migrant continues to contribute to the 
Austrian health system although the migrant has left Austria, the migrant gets reimbursed 
a certain amount of health expenses abroad.  For example, the Austrian health insurance 
funds reimburse any costs up to 80 percent of the price of what the health insurance fund 
would have paid for same treatment to an Austrian provider. Since these benchmark 
prices are heavily subsidized, the migrant usually has to cover a substantial part of the 
costs. 
35
On the other hand, many migrants seem to travel between their former host and home 
country to receive medical treatment in the former host country. In the case of the United 
States, retuned migrants could return to the United States for medical treatment and 
would still be covered. In the Pacific Islands, many former migrants who have formerly 
resided and worked in New Zealand travel back to their host country for medical 
treatment. This is because once the migrants received permanent resident status they also 
receive a returning resident visa and have access to the public health.
 In the United States, the SSA 
does not reimburse any medical costs outside the country. Similar to France, returned, 
retired migrants who receive a U.S. pension have to continue to contribute to Medicare, 
although they do not benefit from it. Given the age at retirement and the associated risk 
of falling sick, private insurance or paying out-of-pocket would be prohibitively 
expensive.  
36 Nevertheless, 
many returned, retired migrants might not be covered by any health insurance, which is 
why Mexico started to offer health insurance specifically for Mexican migrants in the 
United States to ensure that they and their families are covered.
37
Another problem arising from people moving between health systems is related to 
actuarial considerations and the issue of net contributors versus net beneficiaries. If a 
migrant moves relatively young (and healthy) to the host country and works there for 
often many years, the migrant can be considered as a net contributor to the health care 
system. Once back home the migrant may only contribute for some more years and then 
become a net beneficiary in the home country. Particularly in North-South migration, 
where migrant flows are asymmetric, this imposes a burden on the sending country’s 
health care system—potentially even in the presence of bilateral agreements. The 
mentioned insurance sold by Mexico to its US expatriates is one option to mitigate the 
 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35 These countries include Armenia, Azerbaijan,  Bosnia, Croatia, Georgia, Gibraltar, Serbia and 
Montenegro, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Macedonia, Moldova, New Zealand, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and residents of Anguilla, Australia, Barbados, British Virgin Islands, 
Channel Islands, Falkland Islands, Iceland, Isle of Man, Montserrat, St. Helena, Turks and Caicos Islands. 
36 Woolford (2009) 
37 See Holzmann et al (2005)   18 
problem as it generates some contributions from returning migrants, who would 
otherwise enjoy cost-free first-level medical treatment. Similarly, it gives retuning 
migrants a choice to obtain more comprehensive medical services through the public 
health insurance in Mexico, which in particular retired returnees would otherwise not 
have in the private insurance sector because of their age. 
In general, bilateral agreements on the portability of health care benefits seem to be 
difficult to achieve. Also, the main components of health insurance such as risk-pooling 
and prefunding are less transparent and redistributive elements are more persistent. 
Migrants within the EU enjoy the highest standards of portability of health care benefits 
and the EU could serve as an example in this regard. Employees as well as retired people 
are always covered by their country of residence, causing no particular burden for health 
care system due to the rather symmetric migration. The only exception is if the person 
never contributed in the country of retirement. In this case, the country providing the 
services gets compensated by the state which pays the pension. The compensation is paid 
annually and reflects the average cost of a pensioner in that country.
38
3  Global estimates on the social protection status of migrants 
 
A way forward would be to find models to make insurance based health care benefits 
portable without causing disadvantages for one party. Such models could serve as a basis 
to further extend provisions for portability across boarders. Baumann et al. (2008) 
recently presented research on this issue modeling transferable provisions in health 
insurance where at least low risk individuals can switch insurances without financial loss 
and without leaving the pool of insured people that they leave in a worse condition. The 
basic idea is to decompose the aging provisions into two components that is a lifetime 
contract with a level premium based on a guaranteed-renewability arrangement 
complemented by an annuity that smoothes the premium profile. Under this model part of 
the provisions—the capital stock accumulated of the annuity of a low risk—are 
transferable to other insurers. It is not clear however, how the level of the annuity will be 
defined and how low and high risk people can sufficiently be distinguished. Altogether, 
the model is not readily transferable to the international context where the insured also 
switches the country; the main problem would be that it actually excludes high risk 
people from switching which could for example be an older or retiring return migrant. 
However, the model provides a significant starting point to further study the issue. 
To sum up, the provision of social protection varies largely across countries and regions. 
Bilateral social security agreements seem to be the current best practice to make benefits 
portable between countries; however they are mostly applied to the pensions only. The 
following chapter will thus focus on portability of pension benefits and assess the scope 
of portability arrangements within global migrant flows. 
 
This section presents global estimates on the social protection status of international 
migrants. Specifically, the section presents estimates on (i) how many legal migrants 
worldwide move under the protection of a bilateral or multilateral social security 
                                                 
38 For more details, see Holzmann et al. (2005)   19 
arrangement between their origin and host country; (ii) how many legal migrants move 
outside such arrangements, but have access to social security and services in the host 
country; (iii) how many legal migrants are excluded from social security and services in 
the host country; and (iv) how many migrants move undocumented. 
The section first addresses the methodology of the analysis and the data sources and then 
proceeds to present the global estimates. 
3.1  Methodology 
In order to analyze portability of pension benefits among countries it is important to 
classify the categories in terms of social security coverage that each migrant moves 
under. Following Holzmann et al. (2005) all bilateral migrant stocks are categorized into 
one of four regimes. Regime I includes all legal migrants enjoying indiscriminate access 
to social services—in particular social security benefits—in their host country. In 
addition, home and host country have concluded a bilateral or multilateral social security 
arrangement guaranteeing that benefits are payable overseas (exportability of benefits), 
but also the social security institutions of both countries jointly determine eligibility for 
and level of the benefit. This means in particular that periods of contribution to old-age 
pensions in the two countries are added in order to determine if someone qualifies for a 
benefit and to determine the amount of the benefit (totalization). Regime I is the most 
favorable regime in terms of formal social protection for migrants. 
Regime II includes all legal migrants who have access to social services and social 
security in their host country in the absence of a bilateral arrangement between their host 
and origin country. In such cases, the national social law of the host country alone 
determines to what extent benefits are payable overseas, which might result in limited 
exportability of benefits. Totalization of periods of contribution is not possible, so 
acquired social security rights are not fully portable. In addition, in the absence of a 
bilateral arrangement, access to social services for migrants might be limited (non-
discrimination is not guaranteed). 
Regime III includes all legal migrants who do not have access to social security in their 
host country—either because they are excluded or because there is no social security 
system in their host country. This is the case for most of the large migrant-receiving 
countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and some African countries. Access to 
other social services, like education and health care, might be granted. Despite the limited 
access to social security, an advantage of Regime III is that it does not require migrants to 
contribute to long-term benefits like old-age pensions, and hence they do not run the risk 
of losing benefits and rights associated with mandatory contributions.  
Regime IV, finally, includes all undocumented migrants who arguably face the greatest 
challenge regarding their social protection. They have very limited access to social 
services and social security and are subject to unchecked and unregulated labor market 
conditions.  
The global estimates on the status of social protection for international migrants are based 
on data from the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation, and Poverty   20 
(Migration DRC).
39
Due to the scarce information available on undocumented migrants, assumptions needed 
to be made based on available country, regional, and global estimates on undocumented 
migrants from the existing literature. The global stock of undocumented migrants was 
assumed to be 32.5 million in 2000, given the estimates of 30-35 million irregular 
migrants according to the ILO (2002).
 This data gives a complete estimate of global bilateral migrant 
stocks—that is, the data estimate how many migrants by country of origin live in each 
host country, totaling up to over 50,000 country by country estimates. This data is based 
on the 2000/01 census round, yet has some shortcomings with regard to migrants not 
captured by censuses, in particular undocumented migrants. Since undocumented 
migrants are in an especially precarious situation regarding social protection, this paper 
made an effort to complement the data provided by Migration DRC by estimating the 
number of migrants not captured by censuses and undocumented migrants—thus the 
Regime IV migrants.  
40
3.2  Results 
 Further assumptions were made regarding 
migrants not captured by censuses on a global level. Subsequently, the numbers were 
disaggregated according to relative sizes of bilateral stocks. Where possible, regional and 
country information on undocumented migrants and migrants not captured by the census 
was incorporated. For example, estimates on undocumented migrants in, the United 
States, Russia, South Africa, Thailand and Singapore were incorporated. Also, it was 
assumed that there were no undocumented migrants moving between the EU15 and EEA 
countries. Most assumptions on country level are based on the most conservative estimate 
available, and the resulting estimates therefore represent minimum estimates. Also, in 
cases where countries grant freedom of movement of labor among them, no 
undocumented migration was assumed, as in the case of intra-EU migration. The final 
estimates represent the best estimate possible, though the level of accuracy is strongest 
for global and regional estimates, and decreases at country level. 
As a result of the methodology just described, the estimates show a higher global number 
of migrants compared to the Migration DRC data, resulting in almost 187 million 
migrants in 2000/01 worldwide (see Table 1).
 41
 
 The region of Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia (ECA) is supplying the highest share of migrants, particularly as a 
consequence of the break-up of the Soviet Union. The second biggest sender is the EU-27 
and other Europe—also due to the high mobility and an integrated labor market within 
the region. In all regions—except in LAC—intra-regional migrants constitute the highest 
share of all migrants. North America, followed by the EU-27 and other Europe, are the 
biggest receiving regions.  
                                                 
39 See Migration DRC (2007). 
40 See Abella (2002) and Vittin-Balima (2002) in the ILO Labor Education volume. 
41 The Migration DRC data, the basis of this report’s estimates, estimates about 175 million.   21 
Table 1 Global migrant stock estimates and bilateral portability arrangement by origin and host region (2000) 
















America  South Asia 
Sub-Sahara 
Africa  Total 
% global 
stock 
East Asia and 
Pacific  10,451,218  261,715  2,397,524  210,760  1,232,753  7,960,615  483,914  214,378  23,212,877  12% 
Eastern Europe 
and Central 
Asia  585,669  27,453,705  8,437,718  98,641  1,906,963  1,618,709  572,588  842,734  41,516,727  22% 
EU-27 and 
other Europe  2,611,118  2,531,940  13,106,560  1,253,781  1,118,468  7,012,820  387,166  859,007  28,880,860  15% 
Latin America 
and Caribbean  599,267  317,860  2,635,291  3,746,076  473,456  19,881,165  394,517  296,351  28,343,983  15% 
Middle East 
and North 
Africa  373,298  308,571  5,322,781  90,602  7,196,066  1,395,416  244,863  590,254  15,521,851  8% 
North America  426,299  65,989  806,774  754,313  167,834  1,250,399  53,953  59,890  3,585,451  2% 
South Asia  1,001,521  254,613  2,060,491  48,931  8,660,674  2,075,446  10,779,215  301,710  25,182,601  14% 
Sub-Sahara 
Africa  265,609  205,743  2,869,461  42,855  860,137  977,764  254,197  14,795,580  20,271,346  11% 
Total  16,313,999  31,400,136  37,636,600  6,245,959  21,616,351  42,172,334  13,170,413  17,959,904  186,515,696  100% 
% global stock  9%  17%  20%  3%  12%  23%  7%  10%  100%   
                                
Number of bilateral portability arrangements concluded by countries in the region
1:           
   181  148  1628  555  152  94  3  177  2938    
Note: 1. Each bilateral portability arrangement is counted twice, once for both countries involved. Also, some bilateral agreements cover more than two countries. This is the case if 
one or both of the contracting countries have overseas territories, which are usually included as national territory in their contracts (for example, France, UK, USA). Some bilateral 
arrangements are part of a multilateral treaty, like in the EU. 
Source: Migration DRC (2007) and authors’ calculations.               
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Table 2 Global migrant stock estimates and bilateral portability arrangement by origin and host 
income-group (2000) 









































countries  1,147,634  2,689,451  1,721,117  949,142  22,410,626  28,917,970 
16% 
 
30,192,416  44,859,803  17,433,118  11,190,767  82,839,596 
 
100% 
Total  186,515,700 
% global stock  16%  24%  9%  6%  44%  100% 
 
                    
  
Number of bilateral portability arrangements concluded by countries in 
income-group
1:     
 
   92  404  823  461  1157  2937 
  
Note: 1. Each bilateral portability arrangement is counted twice, once for both countries involved. Also, some bilateral 
agreements cover more than two countries. This is the case if one or both of the contracting countries have overseas 
territories, which are usually included as national territory in their contracts (for example, France, UK, USA). Some bilateral 
arrangements are part of a multilateral treaty, like in the EU. 
Source: Migration DRC (2007) and authors’ calculations.       
 
 
The main migration vectors are from lower to higher-income countries, but there is also 
considerable migration among lower income countries. About 130 million migrants (70 
percent) originate from low or lower middle-income countries, while they host only 40 
percent of migrants (see Table 2). In contrast, high-income countries host about 93 
million migrants (50 percent) while sending only 19 percent of migrants. Yet, when 
exploring the data in more detail, it also becomes clear that global migration is not a one-
way street from lower to higher-income countries. Almost 67 million migrants from low 
and lower middle-income countries live in another low or lower middle-income country. 
The latter is no surprise due to the high intra-regional migration. 
What is somewhat surprising, though, is that the large majority of migrants from low-
income countries live in another low-income country—while for all other country-income   23 
groups, the majority of migrants go to high-income OECD countries. It seems that 
migrants from the poorest countries tend to go to other, similarly poor countries.
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About 23 percent of global migrants move under the favorable Regime I of full access 
and full portability (see 
 
Table 3). The share of migrants under Regime I varies 
significantly among the regions. The EU27 countries and other Europe have 80 percent of 
their migrants covered followed by North America with 68 percent. Migrants from poorer 
regions are much worse off, practically no migrants from South Asia, and only 4 percent 
of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa move under Regime I.  
 




Regime I  Regime II  Regime III  Regime IV  Total 
% global 
stock 
East Asia and 
Pacific  3,189,217  15,588,651  825,255  3,609,755  23,212,878  12% 
% total  14%  67%  4%  16%  100%   
Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia  5,231,252  27,484,317  358,591  8,442,567  41,516,727  22% 
% total  13%  66%  1%  20%  100%   
EU-27 and other 
Europe  23,101,222  4,214,004  281,310  1,284,324  28,880,860  15% 
% total  80%  15%  1%  4%  100%   
Latin America 
and Caribbean  4,117,978  16,137,106  167,538  7,921,363  28,343,985  15% 
% total  15%  57%  1%  28%  100%   
Middle East and 
North Africa  3,713,448  6,751,815  2,713,785  2,342,802  15,521,850  8% 
% total  24%  43%  17%  15%  100%   
North America  2,439,139  1,054,736  55,805  35,773  3,585,452  2% 
% total  68%  29%  2%  1%  100%   
South Asia  20,105  16,528,148  4,413,451  4,220,898  25,182,602  14% 
% total  0%  66%  18%  17%  100%   
Sub-Sahara 
Africa  714,570  14,104,664  627,117  4,824,994  20,271,345  11% 
% total  4%  70%  3%  24%  100%    
Total  42,526,931  101,863,440  9,442,851  32,682,476  186,515,698  100% 
% total  23%  55%  5%  18%  100%    
Source: Migration DRC (2007) and authors’ calculations.       
 
Most migrants under Regime I, though, are from and go to high-income countries. More 
than half of the 43 million Regime I migrants originate in high-income OECD countries 
(see Table 4). These countries cover 86 percent of their emigrants under this favorable 
regime. Also, the social protection status of migrants seems to increase with migrants’ 
origin income-country group (see column of Regime I). Moreover, almost all migrants 
(98 percent) moving among high-income OECD countries—so-called “north-north” 
                                                 
42 The largest hotspots of migration between low-income countries are South Asia, West Africa, and 
Central Asia. 
43 For the region-country classification see http://go.worldbank.org/D7SN0B8YU0.  
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migration—are covered by bilateral agreements (see Table 5). With the exception of 
migrants from upper middle-income countries, migrants from developing countries are 
very poorly covered by Regime I. In fact, the top migrant sending countries—Russia, 
Mexico, India, Bangladesh, Ukraine, and China—with emigrant stocks between 6 and 13 
million have concluded next to no bilateral portability arrangements.
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Table 4 Global emigrant stock estimates by origin country income-group and Portability Regime (2000) 
 Thus, protecting 
their emigrants through bilateral agreements seems to be indeed a practice that is 
primarily common in high-income countries.  
 
Origin country 




countries  850,985  36,720,832  5,293,338  10,757,086  53,622,241  29% 
% total  2%  68%  10%  20%  100%   
Lower middle-
income 
countries  11,312,511  47,224,671  3,476,163  14,473,805  76,487,150  41% 
% total  15%  62%  5%  19%  100%   
Upper middle-
income 
countries  3,521,212  10,724,671  189,357  7,203,975  21,639,215  12% 
% total  16%  50%  1%  33%  100%   
Non-OECD 
high-income 
countries  2,063,914  3,534,415  192,987  57,809  5,849,125  3% 
% total  35%  60%  3%  1%  100%   
OECD high-
income 
countries  24,778,310  3,658,850  291,007  189,802  28,917,969  16% 
% total  86%  13%  1%  1%  100%    
Total  42,526,932  101,863,439  9,442,852  32,682,476  186,515,699  100% 
% total  23%  55%  5%  18%  100%    
Source: Migration DRC (2007) and authors’ calculations.       
 
Migrants from developing countries, on the other hand, mostly fall into Regime II. 
Comparing Table 5 with Table 6 reveals that as much as migrants from high-income 
countries are covered by Regime I, migrants moving from countries with lower income 
countries are moving under Regime II. This confirms that poorer regions have much 
more migrants in Regime II, and thus depending on national legislation regarding the 
provision of social security. 
                                                 
44 Nevertheless, the efforts of Mexico and India to negotiate an agreement with the US, and India also with 
various European countries should be acknowledged.   25 
 
Table 5 Global migrant stock estimates of Regime I migrants only by origin and host income-group (2000) 
  Host country income-group   














Total stock  23,339,921  10,989,418  4,832,109  3,332,615  11,128,178  53,622,241 
Regime I stock  156,728  8,410  222,108  371  463,368  850,985 





Total stock  4,817,600  27,815,316  9,099,077  5,592,653  29,162,504  76,487,150 
Regime I stock  5,604  1,559,285  1,343,144  130,076  8,274,403  11,312,511 
% total  





Total stock  691,741  2,095,454  1,447,944  1,110,490  16,293,585  21,639,214 
Regime I stock 
5,252  208,495  962,478  127,250  2,217,738  3,521,212 





Total stock  195,520  1,270,164  332,871  205,867  3,844,703  5,849,125 
Regime I stock  3  1,174  27,699  2,529  2,032,509  2,063,914 





Total stock  1,147,634  2,689,451  1,721,117  949,142  22,410,626  28,917,970 
Regime I stock 
117,696  1,088,024  1,009,941  545,149  22,017,499  24,778,310 
% total   10%  40%  59%  57%  98%  86% 
Total 
  
Total stock  30,192,416  44,859,803  17,433,118  11,190,767  82,839,596  186,515,700 
Regime I stock  285,283  2,865,387  3,565,368  805,376  35,005,518  42,526,932 
% total   1%  6%  20%  7%  42%  23% 
Source: Migration DRC (2007) and authors’ calculations.   26 
 
Table 6 Global migrant stock estimates of Regime II migrants by origin and host income-group (2000) 
  Host country income-group   














23,339,921  10,989,418  4,832,109  3,332,615  11,128,178  53,622,241 
Regime II 
19,149,568  7,237,544  898,283  727,760  8,707,678  36,720,832 





4,817,600  27,815,316  9,099,077  5,592,653  29,162,504  76,487,150 
Regime II 
3,974,561  19,392,970  4,184,551  3,879,982  15,792,607  47,224,671 
% in Regime II 




Total  691,741  2,095,454  1,447,944  1,110,490  16,293,585  21,639,214 
Regime II 
570,056  1,342,214  208,394  566,034  8,037,972  10,724,671 




Total  195,520  1,270,164  332,871  205,867  3,844,703  5,849,125 
Regime II 
192,776  1,246,919  189,995  130,357  1,774,368  3,534,415 





Total  1,147,634  2,689,451  1,721,117  949,142  22,410,626  28,917,970 
Regime II 
1,005,757  1,572,087  633,976  188,419  267,293  3,667,533 
% in Regime II  88%  58%  37%  20%  1%  13% 
Total 
  
Total  30,192,416  44,859,803  17,433,118  11,190,767  82,839,596  186,515,700 
Regime II  24,892,718  30,791,734  6,115,198  5,492,553  34,925,635  102,217,838 
% in Regime II  82%  69%  35%  49%  42%  55% 
Source: Migration DRC (2007) and authors’ calculations.           27 
Also among Regime II migrants, though, the social protection status of migrants depends 
on the region of origin and destination. Migrants moving to high-income countries have 
by and large access to better social security systems and services than migrants moving to 
low or middle-income countries. The weakly developed social security systems in many 
lower (middle) income countries often leave migrants (and most likely many nationals, 
too) in a situation where they cannot rely on the provision of public social services in 
times of need. This is another disadvantage that south-south migrants, who only move 
short distances within low-income regions, face compared to south-north migrants. 
 
Table 7 Estimates of emigrant stocks for top Regime-I-migrant sending countries, with developing countries 
in bold (2000) 
Country of origin 
Emigrants under 
Regime I 




United Kingdom  3,804,695  4,209,287  90% 
Germany  3,465,076  4,084,740  85% 
Italy  3,061,119  3,297,607  93% 
Turkey  2,125,323  3,138,106  68% 
Morocco  1,770,866  1,985,531  89% 
Portugal  1,720,881  2,706,007  64% 
Algeria  1,557,699  1,796,884  87% 
France  1,505,967  2,161,306  70% 
Puerto Rico  1,485,654  1,603,441  93% 
Republic of Korea  1,274,802  1,495,010  85% 
Spain  1,269,907  1,372,344  93% 
United States of America  1,245,931  2,252,928  55% 
Canada  1,187,639  1,306,545  91% 
Serbia and Montenegro  1,036,033  1,766,123  59% 
Ireland  914,135  987,383  93% 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  830,482  1,335,420  62% 
Greece  780,797  933,242  84% 
Poland  729,954  2,184,014  33% 
Netherlands  720,705  788,853  91% 
Romania  643,209  1,114,098  58% 
Source: Migration DRC (2007) and authors’ calculations. Lower/Middle income countries in bold. 
 
Nevertheless, some low and lower-middle income countries have successfully managed 
to protect their migrants by concluding bilateral social security agreements. For example, 
countries like Morocco, Algeria and Turkey have managed to cover 89, 87 and 68 percent 
of their emigrants respectively under Regime I (see Table 7). In addition, there are also 
the regional agreements of CARICOM and MERCOSUR countries, which have made 
efforts to grant nondiscriminatory access to social services and make benefits portable for 
intra-regional migrants. CARICOM has almost 3.4 million migrants of whom 12 percent 
move under Regime I. Yet, it seems that the impact of the CARICOM agreement itself is 
limited due to the relatively low number of intra-regional migrants (see Table 8). Of all   28 
Regime I migrants from CARICOM, only 15 percent are covered by the CARICOM 
agreement. In addition, a study by Forteza (2008) raises questions about the effective 
implementation of the CARICOM portability agreement. 
For migrants from MERCOSUR countries, the same numbers are more balanced. Forty 
percent of all the 2.35 million emigrants from these countries move under Regime I. The 
MERCOSUR agreements cover almost 70 percent of all Regime I migrants. This means 
that these agreements are relevant to 27 percent of all migrants from these countries. 
Clearly, MERCOSUR’s impact seems to be stronger, though it should be noted that it 
also has fewer countries to coordinate and that social security systems are comparatively 
well established. 
 
Table 8 Estimates of emigrant stocks under Regime I for MERCOSUR and CARICOM
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Region of origin 
 (2000) 
MERCOSUR  CARICOM 
Total emigrants from region  2,349,633  3,359,256 
Intra-regional emigrants  766,596  97,001 
Total Regime I emigrants from region  934,173  406,648 
Intra-regional Regime I emigrants   642,599  60,931 
Intra-regional emigrants as % of total 
emigrants from region 
40%  12% 
Intra-regional Regime I emigrants as % of total 
Regime I emigrants from region 
69%  15% 
Intra-regional Regime I emigrants as % of total 
emigrants from region 
27%  2% 
Source: Migration DRC (2007) and authors’ calculations. 
 
In conclusion, it seems that primarily migrants from high-income countries move under 
Regime I because pension systems in these countries tend to be well developed and 
portability agreements in place. The tool of bilateral, or multilateral, arrangements to 
provide social protection for emigrants may not be suitable for low-income countries. 
The example of CARICOM has also shown that it may be difficult to achieve a large 
impact even if taking the effort to negotiate an agreement—which does not mean that 
these countries are not on the right track. Weak development of social security provisions 
and lack of administrative capacity are likely the reason why poorer countries are not in 
the position to engage in bilateral or multilateral negotiations on the social protection for 
their emigrants. Since the large majority of emigrants from low-income countries go to 
other low or lower middle-income countries, the concern is not so much how developing 
countries can coordinate with high-income countries in order to enhance the social 
protection of their emigrants, but how low income countries can develop and strengthen 
social protection system and coordinate among themselves to enhance the social 
protection of south-south migrants. The situation of south-south migrants and the options 
they have in terms of social protection will be analyzed in the next section, focusing on 
the example of migrants from and within the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC). 
                                                 
45 Suriname and Haiti are not part of the agreement on social security. Haiti has the highest share (22%) of 
intra-regional emigrants.   29 
4  Implications for south-south migrants 
This section focuses on issues in social protection of migrants moving among low and 
middle-income countries. Formal as well as informal social protection is looked at to 
discuss the situation and implications of southern migrants. 
4.1  Formal social protection for south-south migrants 
Formal social protection for south-south migrants is limited by two facts: first, a large 
share of south-south migrants are undocumented; and second, even for legal migrants in 
low and lower middle-income countries, provisions for formal social protection are 
limited, even for the native labor force. With regard to the first point, Table 9 shows that 
most undocumented migrants indeed originate in low and lower-middle income countries 
and a very high share is taken up by migrants within the respective groups. For example, 
about three quarters of undocumented migrants from low-income countries migrate to 
other low or middle-income countries. With respect to lower-middle income countries 
undocumented migrants also seem to move primarily to countries at similar income 
levels. Overall, high-income OECD countries are the largest receiver of undocumented 
migrants (based on conservative estimates) with migrants from Mexico to the US as the 
main driver. This group is followed by lower middle-income host countries with, for 
example, South Africa as a main receiver. 
 
Table 9: Global migrant stock estimates of Regime IV migrants only (undocumented migrants) by 
origin and host income-group (2000) 
















countries  Total 
Low-income 
countries  3,775,249  3,681,516  781,597  561,591  1,957,132  10,757,086 
Lower middle-
income 
countries  779,250  6,156,610  1,471,782  970,669  5,095,494  14,473,805 
Upper middle-
income 
countries  111,890  531,205  234,206  288,799  6,037,875  7,203,975 
Non-OECD 
high-income 
countries  1,949  12,663  3,319  2,052  37,825  57,809 
OECD high-
income 
countries  11,442  26,805  17,160  8,563  125,833  189,802 
Total  4,679,780  10,408,798  2,508,064  1,831,674  13,254,160  32,682,476 
Source: Migration DRC (2007) and authors’ calculations.       
 
With regard to the second point that even for legal migrant’s social protection is limited, 
it should first of all be said that formal social security provisions in low and middle-
income countries are usually also insufficient for natives. For example, a country like 
Malawi does not have a general social security system that provides a public, 
contribution-based pension to the native labor force. Typically, these countries rely on 
occupational schemes and provide contribution-based social security only for public   30 
servants and the military. Further, lack of formal social protection is not only due to weak 
public provisions, but also because a large share of the labor force—migrants or not—
work in the informal sector. For example, in Zambia only 10 percent of the labor force 
work in formal employment and have access to social security.
46 Approaching 
improvement in social security and more broadly in social protection from a regional 
perspective seems to be promising, however, largely dependent on the effort countries put 
into it. SADC recently agreed on a Social Charter relating to a number of social rights 
and stressing the importance to provide protection to people in need, but it is unclear how 
to implement such standards in each country.
47
Given this environment of weak social security systems, as it is the case in SADC, 
migrants are particularly vulnerable because they are discriminated against. Migrants are 
subject to immigration laws, which differentiate between permanent residents, temporary 
residents, migrant workers, refugees, asylum-seekers and undocumented non-citizens. 
Most importantly, social security laws discriminate between these different groups and 
exclude certain groups from its provisions. Thus, migrants in some groups cannot rely on 
any set legal social security framework (Olivier 2009).
  
48 Moreover, in some countries 
where social services can actually be accessed by migrants, they may still suffer from 
discrimination; for example, in Zambia the provision of education requires paying higher 
fees for non-citizens.
49 Discrimination is likely to be hardest for particularly vulnerable 
groups such as irregular migrants, refugees, and women in particular.
50
Given the previous discussion it is also no surprise that southern African countries have 
little to offer with respect to portability of benefits. Most benefits are tax-financed social 
assistance benefits and social security often relies primarily on occupational schemes, if 
any.
 
51 Nevertheless, there are some attempts to address portability. For example, the 
agreement between Zambia and Malawi states that the Workers Compensation Fund in 
Zambia has to identify a medical practitioner in Malawi to administer medical 
examinations or assessment for pneumoconiosis/silicosis for Malawian miners who 
worked in Zambia. In the long run, it should also facilitate the remittance of monthly 
pension through the Malawi High Commission in Lusaka.
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46 See Muyembe (2007). 
47 Olivier (2009). 
48 Also see Ntseane and Solo (2007), Adongo (2007), CICLASS (2007), Nyenty et al. (2007), Muyembe 
(2007), Makhema (2009) for country studies. 
49 See Muyembe (2007). 
50 Makhema (2009). 
51 See Ntseane and Solo (2007), Adongo (2007), CICLASS (2007), Nyenty et al. (2007), Muyembe (2007), 
Makhema (2009). 
52 Olivier (2009). 
 South Africa has also entered 
into so-called labor agreements with a range of SADC countries, but mostly the 
agreements do not cover public social security schemes, and constitute merely employer-
based occupational arrangements. The few social security arrangements typically arrange 
for the payment of taxes to the government of the sending country such as deferred pay to 
be paid to the foreign national in the sending country upon return to that country; 
allowances payable to family members; and monies to be paid into a welfare fund which 
may be set up by the government of the sending country for the purpose of supporting   31 
such citizens during periods of their disablement upon return to the sending country. 
However, the enforcement of employer’s compliance with such regulations is 
questionable. Also, it should be noted that all these arrangements obviously do not 
provide for desired features of coordinating regimes, such as maintenance of acquired 
rights, aggregation of insurance periods, and equality of treatment with nationals of the 
receiving country in social security matters. 
Regional efforts may help to bring about change in the approach to social protection 
across borders; however, their impact may be limited for the same reasons that deter the 
implementation of comprehensive social security systems.  SADC, for example, has 
agreed on a Social Code which touches upon migrants’ rights, encourages members to 
protect their immigrants, give them equal access to the social security system, and offer at 
least basic protection to undocumented migrants. Further, member states are encouraged 
to introduce, by way of national legislation and bi- or multilateral arrangements, cross-
border co-ordination principles, such as maintenance of acquired rights, aggregation of 
insurance periods, and exportability of benefits. However, the Social Code is not a legally 
binding agreement and, given the status quo of the welfare systems in SADC, it seems to 
be more of a wishful thinking. 
It seems overall that the agenda to bring forward social protection for migrants within 
SADC and potentially south-south migrants in other regions is not very well developed. 
One question is consequently if there are lessons to be learned from other regional 
agreements. The EU has probably been the most successful region in concluding 
multilateral and bilateral agreements. It has to be mentioned, though, that the EU is a 
fairly homogenous region with similarly well developed social systems. Equally well 
developed systems are easier to connect and to coordinate, in particular with regard to 
complex actuarial transactions. Also, the capacity to administer such agreements, 
including record-keeping and tracing of contributions as well as executing complicated 
actuarial operations like totalization of periods of contribution, is well developed.   
These observations about EU social security arrangements and the previous analysis 
which mainly gave examples from SADC make clear that many low-income countries 
might be far from being ready to conclude such agreements. Their welfare systems are 
too unprepared to engage in these complex issues. Social security is not even ensured to 
be a social right in many countries, and the large number of undocumented migrants and 
informal workers results in a diminutive share of the workforce being covered.  
Similarly, the models of CARICOM or MERCOSUR cannot serve as examples for 
regions with mostly low-income countries like SADC, although these countries are more 
similar than the EU with respect to the challenges the countries face. CARICOM and 
MERCOSUR are indeed in a better position because they have better developed social 
security systems. 
SADC is not the same as the EU, nor the same as CARICOM or MERCOSUR: there are 
no strong social security systems in place. Most of the countries in SADC are low-
income countries, capacities to administer elaborate social security systems—or bilateral 
social security agreements—are low; and most of the few social protection systems in 
place are, in fact, tax-funded social assistance programs, and not social security 
programs.   32 
Following this idea of tax-funded social protection, one can look at countries like 
Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom who rely less on social security and 
more on tax-financed social assistance systems. Intuitively, it seems to be clear that tax-
funded benefits are less portable. As already mentioned, the link between contributions 
and benefits is less explicit because taxes are not earmarked like contributions. Also, 
social assistance systems usually do not have an explicit long-term component with a pre-
saving element: taxes are paid now, and redistributed to those in need now. There is no 
element of return in the future, like with social security contributions. Even within the 
EU, tax financed benefits like social assistance are not portable. Nevertheless, countries 
that rely more on social assistance and less on social security have made some of their 
benefits portable, and the question is if there are any lessons to be learned for low-income 
countries. 
The short answer is that the lessons to be learned from tax-financed benefits are also 
limited. The qualifying conditions for tax-financed benefits are closely tied to residency 
in the host country and means-testing. These benefits can only be made portable with the 
same type of bilateral agreement mentioned above—with the same complex 
administrative requirements. Yet, the disadvantage is that in the absence of a bilateral 
agreement, these benefits are not even exportable (like in Australia). New Zealand is an 
exception as its national law specifically allows the tax-financed old-age pension to be 
paid in the Pacific Islands. Nevertheless, even in that case the migrant still has to be 
resident of New Zealand at the age of 65. Migrants who have left New Zealand before 
that—even if they have paid New Zealand taxes for many years—do not have an 
entitlement.
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Hence, it seems that there is no real portability model yet for SADC and other low-
income countries on how to enhance the formal social protection for their emigrants and 
migrants. And again, given the limited provisions and low overall coverage by social 
security of the labor force in SADC, it seems that concerns about the lack of portability 
of benefits are pre-mature. Instead, it seems that a more effective policy direction to 
improve the social protection position of international migrants in SADC is to (i) create a 
proper policy framework to manage migration in the region, in particular undocumented 
migration; (ii) focus on the social protection for the most vulnerable groups—women, 
children, refugees and undocumented migrants—by improving their legal status in the 
host country and ensuring that their most basic rights are respected; and (iii) develop 
standards on how to coordinate social systems in the future to ensure portability of 
acquired social security rights. The latter point is undoubtedly closely related to 
enhancing the social protection frameworks of countries itself—that is, to develop a 
 
There are some lessons to be learned from Australia’s defined-contribution 
superannuation pension. This is a fully funded pension system with individual accounts, 
which are in principle fully exportable. Once the migrant leaves the country, the account 
is simply paid out, although the Australian tax system seems to provide strong 
disincentives to do so. This is in fact very similar to the occupational schemes that are 
provided by many employers in SADC as old-age benefits for their employees, yet it is 
unclear how well these funds work for migrants. 
                                                 
53 Wolford (2009)   33 
framework not only for migrants, but also the native population. This will also require 
discussing the role of the state to establish such a framework for social risk management: 
for individuals, businesses and governments. The instruments for such social risk 
management are many and include measures such as private savings (therefore ensuring 
efficiency and accessibility to savings institutions), information dissemination (such as on 
variability of rainfall), and education in risk management. 
The previous section discussed the level of social protection that migrants have in SADC 
and particularly highlighted what they do not have and what challenges countries still 
face in the future. It remains to further look at the micro level and see what options 
migrants are left with, outside the formal social protection framework provided by the 
employers and governments. That is, how can they protect themselves and what role does 
informal social protection play. 
4.2  Informal social protection in SADC  
As mentioned in the beginning, informal social protection is part of the definition of 
social protection and refers to institutions and networks that migrants take advantage of 
outside formal provisions. These can for example be migrant networks existing through 
established migration routes and local communities and churches providing help for their 
members. In order to analyze this part the following will refer to research by Sabates-
Wheeler (2008) which has been conducted jointly with this study but focused more 
heavily on informal rather than on formal social protection. The center of this research is 
a survey done in Malawi where Malawian return migrants from South Africa vis-à-vis 
from the United Kingdom were interviewed regarding their migration experience. The 
findings on what role migration plays in the life of these migrants and how they protect 
themselves are very important to evaluate the situation of south-south migrants. 
 
























Source: Sabates-Wheeler (2008) 
   34 
The study finds that migrants from poorer and less educated backgrounds migrate 
primarily to the nearer places.
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The study further confirms what the global data and analysis of national provisions have 
concluded regarding formal social protection. Only a small share of migrants enjoys 
employment-based social protection—at destination and origin. 
 Despite this selection depending on the destination, the 
migrants in this study achieved positive migration outcomes independent of their 
characteristics and particularly migrant status (legal versus illegal). In fact, south-south 
migration seems to have a poverty alleviating impact. In the survey, the respondents were 
asked to evaluate their pre and post poverty status and all migrants, but particularly those 
migrating to South Africa, felt that migration had considerably improved their situation. 
Figure 1 illustrates this result in detail. 
Further the study comes to the conclusion that migrants protect themselves through 
remittances and accumulation of assets at home and that migration constitutes their main 
risk-management strategy. It seems that migrants to South Africa usually migrate for a 
specific purpose like for example being able to buy assets or land. Also, they do not 
intend to stay in South Africa for longer periods. Thus, migration itself is their social 
protection from the risks they face at home. 
Table 10 confirms that 
UK-migrants are better off from the beginning (selection) also in terms of their social 
security position. South African migrants seem to start out with little social protection 
provision and hardly have any at destination (many are also unemployed at origin). This 
confirms the high level of informality of migrants to South Africa. And, as the study 
further finds, migrants do heavily rely on informal social protection mechanisms. Social 
networks seem to be an important factor for achieving positive migration outcomes. 
Qualitative research that complemented this study found that migrants sought help in 
churches, burial societies and also employers sometimes offered their illegal employees 
health and housing support.
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Table 10: Percentage of migrants having access to standard employment-based social protection at 
origin and at destination 
 
 
   UK-migrants  SA-migrants 
   Entitled at origin  Entitled at destination  Entitled at origin  Entitled at destination 
Yes  82  53  28  13 
No  18  47  72  87 
Source: Sabates-Wheeler (2008)       
 
To sum up the most crucial result from this research focusing on informal social 
protection is that migration itself is a social protection tool for many people and that it is 
migration itself that may particularly help poor people to improve their situation. This is 
certainly not to say that formal social protection is not important but rather it needs to be 
enhanced to make the migration experience even more beneficial for migrants. 
                                                 
54 Also most SADC migrants go to South Africa. 
55 Reitzes and Sabates-Wheeler (2008)   35 
 
5  Conclusion 
The discussion above made clear that formal social protection for migrants is provided on 
different levels, depending on the nature of migration flows. North-north migrants are 
clearly in the best position in terms of access to and portability of social security benefits. 
Migrants of south-north migration flows often do not move under the favorable Regime I, 
but nevertheless can take advantage of developed social security systems in their host 
countries that may also provide legislation on the export of pensions. South-south 
migrants are in the most disadvantaged position with regard to access to all forms of 
social protection and portability arrangements. This also translates into different 
implications for policy makers on how to approach the issue of social protection for their 
migrants. While bilateral social security agreements can currently be seen as the best 
practice to enhance social protection for migrants from and to high-income countries, this 
might be insufficient in the case of developing countries that do not have very well 
developed social security systems.  
The analysis shows various examples on how different regional blocks and countries deal 
with formal social protection and portability. For pensions, the system of bilateral 
agreements is quite well developed if countries meet certain preconditions regarding 
administrative capacity of social security institutions. Portability arrangements for health 
care, however, seem to be difficult to achieve, perhaps with the exception of the EU. 
There seems to be no ideal model yet for regional economic blocks of mainly low-income 
countries like SADC on how to enhance the formal social protection for their emigrants 
and immigrants. Thus, the above discussion leads to the conclusion that migration among 
developing countries needs to be looked at from an entirely different perspective. In fact, 
migration itself provides one of the main social protection instruments for these migrants 
and their families. The policy challenge is to make south-south migration safer for 
migrants in order to maximize benefits from this important livelihood strategy. 
This is not to say, though, that formal social protection for south-south migrants is 
irrelevant. Yet, the priorities are different than in the case of south-north or north-north 
migration and one has to differentiate when looking into policy implications. Policy 
measures for developed countries primarily concern reforms of current defined benefit 
systems towards more actuarial structures, like notional DC-type systems. The goal 
would be to improve individual and fiscal fairness as well as the administrative burden 
associated with the coordination between social security authorities. More importantly, 
developed countries need to look into models on how to include health care benefits into 
bilateral arrangements, a task that is certainly challenging due to the complexity of health 
care systems. 
For migrants within poorer regions, the way forward is of a different nature. Important 
priorities include the following: 
1. Improve the legal position of migrants. Many south-south migrants seem to face 
serious restrictions to gain access to or enforce their basic rights, including social rights. 
In other words, migrants are either excluded from certain rights or lack the means to gain 
access to justice in cases when their rights are violated. This does not necessarily   36 
translate into a call for migrants to be granted social rights like pension benefits, health 
benefits and the like, but a call to guarantee such basic rights as freedom from 
exploitation and getting paid proper wages in cash (as opposed to in-kind), getting paid 
wages on time, or safe workplace conditions. The access to such basic rights is essential 
to ensure that migrants receive a minimum benefit from their migration experience, and 
such rights should be granted independent of their legal status. The large number of 
undocumented migrants, though, aggravates this problem as their legal and social 
position is weak and many migrants easily fall victim to exploitation, in particular 
vulnerable groups like women and youth. In addition, it is often not sufficient to grant 
access to such basic rights, but also to legally empower migrants so they actually exercise 
their rights when they are exploited.
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In addition, any policies attempting to select and control the composition of migration 
flows are likely to fail. Both legal and undocumented migrants are likely to benefit from 
migration, so as long as there is adequate demand for migrants in domestic labor markets, 
undocumented migrants are likely to move. If policy makers seek to formalize migration, 
this reality has to be acknowledged. Therefore, any migration framework should include 
demand driven components that provide strong links between demand in domestic labor 
markets and supply of migrant labor. Control and management of migration via 
instruments such as point-based systems are unlikely to work in contexts such as South 
Africa or other middle-income host countries, where demand from the informal and 
unskilled labor market is met with a supply of undocumented migrants. A proper regional 
 
The lack of access to such basic rights and the lack of legal empowerment to exercise 
such rights erode the benefits of migration for all parties and seriously undermine its 
development impact, including productive employment and decent work. It is also in the 
interest of native workers because without such provisions, employers have an incentive 
to favor more vulnerable and thus cheaper labor over native workers. In other words, 
discrimination against migrants in terms of basic rights also makes migrants cheaper for 
employers—at the expense of native workers. At the same time, it has to be 
acknowledged that improving the legal position of migrants and expanding their rights 
could also come at a price as the demand for migrant labor could decrease. 
2. Develop a migration policy framework. Closely linked to the previous point is the 
importance to develop a comprehensive policy framework to better manage south-south 
migration. Given that south-south migration mainly seems to be of circular nature—as 
the research of Malawian migrants indicated—demand-driven migration programs might 
offer the best policy framework for migration. A circular migration scheme that would 
grant work permits to migrants to work in seasonal jobs and specific sectors for a limited 
time would be one way to go forward. These measures would lift many migrants into the 
status of legal migrants, which may make it easier for them to improve their livelihoods 
(at destination, in transit, and at origin) and to eventually improve their access to formal 
social protection.  
                                                 
56 For more information on issues related to access to justice and legal empowerment, visit the website of 
the World Bank’s “Justice for the Poor” program at http://go.worldbank.org/MHG1Y94BM0.   37 
migration framework that opens legal opportunities for temporary migration—including 
low-skilled migration—is most likely to have the greatest impact.
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4. Ensure access to safe and affordable remittance channels and to the financial 
sector. Many migrants are primarily concerned with the welfare of their families back 
home and remittances are the means by which families are supported, homes are built, 
basic needs are purchased, children are schooled and investments are made. Migrants, 
especially the undocumented ones, are often denied access to the banking system (be it a 
bank, a post office account or a financial intermediary), which is of crucial importance 
for all migrants who want to transfer remittances to their families in a safe and affordable 
manner. Fortunately, international money transfer organizations are now widely available 
and easily accessible, yet often at high prices.
 
3. Ensure exportability and portability of those benefits that are legally also 
available to migrants, in particular workers compensation, severance payments, and 
benefits from provident funds. One opportunity to enhance the formal social protection 
for migrants in low-income regions would be to improve the exportability and portability 
of some of the few benefits that are available to formal migrant workers, like, for 
example, workers compensation benefits, severance payments, and payments from 
provident funds. These benefits are present in most low-income countries and migrants—
legal and undocumented—frequently seem to make contributions to these benefits. 
Although most of these benefits are legally exportable—in the cases of severance 
payments, workers compensation, and payments from provident funds, benefits are 
simply paid out as a lump sum—the provisions on cross-border payments (exportability) 
seem to be poorly implemented, so that more often than not payouts from these benefits 
never reach migrants or their survivors in migrants’ home countries. Hence, it is crucial 
to ensure the proper implementation of such provisions as a first step to improving formal 
social protection for migrants. Occupational schemes, on the other hand, also involve an 
accrual of periods of contribution over time, so that some form of portability would be 
desirable. Yet, even within such an integrated region as the EU the portability of 
occupational benefits is not very well developed, which highlights how challenging this 
would be for low-income regions. 
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57 A promising example of a regional migration framework is the recently launched Abu Dhabi Dialogue 
that aims at paving the way for the better management of temporary contractual labour mobility between 
the United Arab Emirates and its main sending countries in South Asia. See speech by Luca Dall'Oglio, 
Permanent Observer to the United Nations, at the 46
th session of the commission for Social Development: 
 Governments must think creatively about 
secure and efficient ways of encouraging and facilitating access to remitting services for 
all migrants. This would be an obvious advantage for the migrant and for the destination 
economy. It may likely have a longer-term spin off whereby migrants begin to save and 
open bank accounts also in their home country, gaining access to formal financing tools 
in the banking sector. Access to the financial markets is likely to greatly enhance the 
poverty alleviating effect that the study of Malawians found for migrants to South Africa, 
as migrants can make better use of their earnings and have safer ways to transfer them to 
their families. 
http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/cache/offonce/pid/1336?entryId=16565 (accessed on 15
th June, 2008). 
58 For a sample of fees for remitting money between countries, see, for example, the World Bank’s 
“Remittance Prices Worldwide” database at http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/.   38 
5. Expand research on labor market conditions in receiving countries. A more 
general question to explore in the context of south-south migration is the question: why 
are middle-income countries like South Africa experiencing high immigration while 
simultaneously having a high unemployment rate among the native labor force—in the 
case of South Africa, about 40 percent. Such high unemployment should considerably 
lower wages and make migration less attractive, thus decreasing inflows. However, this 
does not seem to be the case in South Africa. 
There are various possible explanations at hand to shed light onto this question. First, it 
could be that migrants may serve different labor market segments than natives and work 
in jobs that natives are unwilling to do even if unemployed. Anecdotal evidence and 
findings from this research indicate that this is likely to be the case. Second, the expected 
wages for migrants may still be high enough to compensate for long spells of 
unemployment, so that the expected net benefit of migration is still positive. This could 
be of particularly importance for migrants coming from countries with very limited 
economic opportunities, such as low-income countries under stress and fragile states, like 
Zimbabwe.
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59 There are similar findings in the rural-urban migration context. 
 Third, employers may prefer migrants because they are willing to accept 
lower wages and worse working condition than natives. In this case, the extent and 
appropriateness of labor market regulations, unemployment benefits, and social 
assistance programs of receiving countries have to be explored. Finally, from the results 
of the qualitative work on Malawians, there is evidence to believe that migrants may be 
perceived as more reliable than unskilled native workers, so that there is a discriminatory 
bias in labor demand in favor of migrants, at the expense of natives.  
In conclusion, this research shows that in order to enhance social protection for migrants 
one has to differentiate between different migration flows: north-north, south-north, and 
south-south. Migration flows involving high-income countries require bilateral policy 
interventions to improve portability, while migration flows among low and middle-
income countries require policy interventions to foster basic social rights for migrants and 
sensible migration policy frameworks. The latter aims to ensure that those people, the 
world’s poor, who use migration as a vital social risk management strategy, fully benefit 
from their migration experience and therefore to enhance the beneficial effects of 
migration as social protection.   39 
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To view Social Protection Discussion papers published prior to 2007, please visit 
www.worldbank.org/sp. Summary Findings
This paper analyzes the issue of social protection for 
migrants by looking at formal and informal social protection 
provisions. In particular, it presents the latest global data 
on the social protection status on migrants, including 
undocumented migrants. The paper gives special attention 
to lower-income countries drawing upon recent studies 
from the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC). It finds that migrants in poorer countries have 
very limited access to formal social protection such as 
social security systems, and that the legal social protection 
frameworks are far from making benefits portable. Rather, 
migrants have to rely on informal social protection, and 
it is often migration itself that constitutes a form of social 
protection for migrants and their families. This means that 
making migration safer for low-income migrants is vital 
to allow migrants to fully benefit from their migration 
experience and to ultimately enhance their social protection.
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT NETWORK
About this series...
Social Protection Discussion Papers are published to communicate the results of The World Bank’s work to 
the development community with the least possible delay. The typescript manuscript of this paper therefore 
has not been prepared in accordance with the procedures appropriate to formally edited texts. The findings, 
interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect 
the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank and its affiliated 
organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of The World Bank or the governments they represent.  
The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work.
For free copies of this paper, please contact the Social Protection Advisory Service, The World Bank, 1818 
H Street, N.W., MSN G7-703, Washington, D.C. 20433 USA. Telephone: (202) 458-5267, Fax: (202) 614-0471, 
E-mail: socialprotection@worldbank.org or visit the Social Protection website at www.worldbank.org/sp.
Definitions, Good Practices, 
and Global Estimates on the 
Status of Social Protection for 
International Migrants
Johanna Avato, Johannes Koettl 
and Rachel Sabates-Wheeler
SP DISCUSSION PAPER
May 2009
NO. 0909